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Short-range (Bluetooth) and to so extent medium-range (WiFi) wireless 
networks are ubiquitous, being used in such places as the homes, hospitals, 
assembly lines, aircraft, and even wearable computers. Several types of attacks 
have been successful at defeating the cryptosystems used by IEEE 802.11 and 
802.16 technologies, leading one to ask the question:  how much trust should we 
place in the wireless encryption protocols?  
In 2008 Dinur and Shamir proposed a type of algebraic attack called the 
cube attack [1] in which the active assault on a cryptosystem requires the 
attacker to extract useful information from the bit stream. By skillfully choosing 
some publicly settable bits, the attacker may be able to replace the degree of the 
polynomial that represents the encryption function by a system of linear 
equations. Dinur and Shamir used this approach on the Trivium cipher and 
recovered the encryption key in 192  bit operations. The best attempt reported in 
the literature was that of Fischer, Khazaei and Meier [2] using chosen 
initialization vector (IV) statistical analysis and they succeeded in key recovery 
with a complexity of 552 bit operations. 
 BLUETOOTH AND PREVIOUS ATTACKS  
Bluetooth is a well-established wireless communications standard (IEEE 
802.15.1) between different devices (e.g., personal computers, laptops, mobile 
phones) that operates over a short range and at low power. For efficiency 
reasons - speed, size and power consumption - the system uses the E0 (128 bit) 
stream cipher instead of one of the widely used block ciphers. In E0 cipher, four 
linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) are used and a nonlinear Boolean 
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function combines their output. Combining the plaintext with the output key 
stream using an exclusive OR (XOR) produces the ciphertext.  
Several attacks have been implemented on the Bluetooth system. In 2003, 
Armknecht and Krause [3] applied an algebraic attack on Bluetooth E0 (the idea 
of an algebraic attack is based on the ability of an attacker to solve a system of 
nonlinear multivariable equations of low degree). They recovered the key in 
68.482 operations after the adversary had knowledge of 23.072 keystream bits. In 
2004, Armknecht in [4] reduced the complexity at 54.512 operations after the 
adversary had knowledge of 23.442 keystream bits, by using a precomputation 
step. In 2004, Lu and Vaudenay [5] introduced a fast correlation attack by 
formulating a powerful computation method of correlations using a recursive 
expression based on the maximum likelihood decoding (MLD) algorithm using a 
fast Walsh transform (FWT). In order for their attack to succeed, they built a 
distinguisher for E0 based on the largest bias they found.  Their best result for E0 
is limited to 372 operations. In 2005, Lu, Meier, and Vaudenay [6] proposed the 
conditional correlation attack which studies the linear correlation of the inputs 
conditioned on a known output pattern of a particular nonlinear function. The best 
result that they obtained on the E0 keystream generator required 24 bits of 
38.52 computations for key recovery. 
 CUBE ATTACK  
The cube attack is a generic attack that may be applied to block ciphers, 
stream ciphers, or even keyed hash functions without necessarily having 
knowledge of the internal structure of the cipher, as long as at least one output 
bit can be represented by a polynomial of low degree of the secret and public 
variables. The foundation of the approach proposed by Dinur and Shamir is basic 
algebraic cryptanalysis, which involves attempting to lower the degree of the 
polynomial equations that represent a cryptosystem by polynomials of lower 
degree. They assume that the polynomial equations used to describe a 
cryptosystem are variants derived from a master polynomial by adding some 
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variables to any possible value. They call this attack the cube attack “...since it 
sets some public variables to all their possible values in n , ( 1)d  -dimensional 
Boolean cubes, and sums the results in each cube" (cf. [1]), where d  represents 
the degree of the polynomial and n  is the number of variables.  
The cube attack may be completed in two phases: the preprocessing 
phase, where the attacker finds as many maxterms (a term or cube of the 
encryption function such that its co-factor is a linear nonconstant polynomial) as 
possible and the actual attacking or online phase where the attacker solves the 
system of linear equations. 
 APPLICATION 
 During our investigation, we adopted Armknecht and Krause’s approach in 
order to model the E0 encryption function, so that we are not to be dependent on 
memory bits and which will hold for every clock tick. We came up with a 
polynomial of degree four consisting of twenty variables, sixteen considered 
unknown and four known; the details are available in [7]. 
We then created an automated tool in the Maple 12 environment 
(http://www.maplesoft.com) that finds all of the maxterms and their corresponding 
superpolys (linear coefficients) for the E0 encryption function. The most time-
consuming work in the computation process, finding the maxterms and their 
corresponding superpolys, was executed in the Maple 12 environment because 
we wanted to benefit from the advantages of a high-performance mathematical 
engine with a fully integrated algebraic processing system.  
In the online phase, we used a chosen plaintext attack to solve the system 
of 12 linear equations by 8 unknowns we found. Part of the cube attack is a 
chosen plaintext attack – the part that can be manipulated by the attacker. In 
order to implement the cube attack we assume that the attacker has the 
capability of sending properly structured packets that the Bluetooth receiver will 
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respond to, thus providing the attacker with access to the encryption machine.1  
Note that the encryption machine behaves like an oracle. If the attacker 
convinces the Bluetooth oracle that he or she is a legitimate participant then the 
oracle will be duped into sending data to the attacker or another participant; 
however, the attacker can observe “over the air,” whatever responses the oracle 
or the user sends back. For instance, the attacker can masquerade as a real 
user, with sufficient detail, so that he can send data to the oracle. The oracle will 
send encrypted data back to the attacker or to an authorized user/participant in 
the communication process and the attacker will collect this data. The attacker 
will gain some knowledge of the output bitstreams of the combiner at clock times 
t, t+1, t+2, and t+3. More formally, we proved in [7] that assuming that an 
attacker has unauthorized access to the encryption protocol, then by knowing the 
output bitstream at any clock time, the cube attack as we have modeled it, is 
successful in recovering the outputs of the LFSRs of the E0 keystream generator 
at any stage.  
RESULTS 
Using the Maple program, we found twelve superpolys, including the 
unknown variables of the 4 LFSRs for two consecutive clock times. The program 
was executed on an Intel Pentium 4 processor with a CPU of 2.80Ghz and 1GB 
of RAM, and the results were produced in 8.03 seconds, consuming 5.25 MB of 
memory. 
 From the specific encryption function of the multivariable polynomial 
(obtained after the attacker masquerades as an authorized user and gains 
access to the security protocol), the attacker will eventually succeed in gathering 
twelve unique and independent equations, solve them using a chosen plaintext 
attack and recover the output bits of the LFSRs. 
                                              
1 This is not quite as easy to do in Bluetooth as it is with, say, 802.11 based system, but can 
be accomplished with some work.  
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We measured the complexity of the steps. During the preprocessing 
phase an attacker tries to find as many maxterms as possible. From this phase, 
an attacker may obtain n+1 output bits from the LFSRs and some constant 
terms. The amount of work needed, based on the analysis in [8] is  
1( 1)2dn n  , 
where d as the degree of the encryption function f and n as the number of 
variables. The attacker also needs to compute the inverse of the matrix of linear 
relations. This produces an upper bound from this phase of 
1 3( 1)2dn n n   
For the online phase, in which it is necessary to solve the system of linear 
equations implementing a chosen plaintext attack, 12dn  evaluations of the E0 
encryption function are needed, and the matrix multiplication which takes 
2n operations needs to be performed. Again, using the analyses described in [1, 
8] we deduce a complexity of 
1 22dn n   
Therefore, the overall complexity from both phases is as follows: 
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which is equivalent to 2 1 3( 2 )dO n n  . 
In the case of Bluetooth with n=128 and d=4, we determine that the attack on E0 
requires 
21.12246656 2  
bit operations. 
The number of operations needed in the computational process is considerably 
less than that of similar algebraic types of attacks described in [3]-[6], but it is 
limited to the output of the LFSRs at any clock tick. Further insight is necessary 
Comment [npetrako1]: I include the 
correlation attacks also, if only the algebraic 
then it is [3],[4] 
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to reveal the encryption key having the output of every LFSR at any time. This 
raises the question: given the output of the LFSRs how do we find the key? 
Building on these results, the next stage of the research is to validate our 
integration of the cube-type attack into the Bluetooth encryption protocol. As 
demonstrated in this and other research we cited one needs to be able to 
understand and formally evaluate the strengths of a given cryptosystem and be 
able to evaluate the implementation of the cryptosystem to ensure that there are 
no flaws in the application of the cryptosystem. The cryptosystem and the 
protocol it uses may be good but if poorly implemented will most likely be 
untrustworthy.  
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